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Toward a Genealogy of
Americanist Expressionism
Ryan Carr
Yale University

In a 1910 lecture titled “The New Criticism,” Joel
Spingarn announced that he had divined the master- concept that had
made possible all significant literary criticism of the past century.
But with the Romantic Movement there developed the new idea
which coördinates all Criticism in the nineteenth century. Very early
in the century, Mme. de Staël and others formulated the idea that
Literature is an “expression of society.” Victor Cousin founded the
school of art for art’s sake, enunciating “the fundamental rule, that
expression is the supreme law of art.” Later, Sainte-Beuve developed and illustrated his theory that Literature is an expression of
personality. Still later, under the influence of natural science,
Taine took a hint from Hegel and elaborated the idea that Literature is an expression of race, age, and environment. The extreme
impressionists prefer to think of art as the exquisite expression of
delicate and fluctuating sensations or impressions of life. But for
all these critics and theorists, Literature is an expression of
something, of experience or emotion, of the external or the
internal, of the man himself or something outside the man; yet it
is always conceived of as an art of expression.1
Spingarn’s capsule history, a founding moment of the literary- critical
school that would soon be called “expressionism,” imposes unity upon a
century of literary and cultural study that had moved in numerous, often orthogonal theoretical directions. By bringing figures as diverse as
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Staël, Taine, and Sainte-Beuve under the same methodological umbrella,
Spingarn sought to cut through the tangled web of intellectual history
by uncovering a developing consensus that literature is expression before it is anything else. And in this he was largely successful; as Gerald
Graff recognizes in Professing Literature, Spingarn was a “disciplinary
reformer” whose “desire to clean up the disorderly conceptual situation
of criticism anticipated the project I. A. Richards would shortly initiate
at Cambridge.”2 Nor was Spingarn the first American literary scholar who
found expression indispensible for formulating the discipline’s goals. In
the first number of the Transactions of the brand new Modern Language
Association (later renamed PMLA), Theodore Hunt sought to vindicate
the still- emerging field of modern philology by insisting that “because
of what the English is in itself as a language and literature . . . all that is
English must have ‘ample room and verge enough’ to give it its proper
expression in the national history.”3 A few years later, Thomas Price
would speak in his inaugural address as President of the MLA of “an intense eagerness for personal expression in literature” and argue that the
challenge facing English professors was to channel that natural desire
into a properly disciplined receptivity to what he called “form.”4 These
scholars might not have gone quite as far as Spingarn in insisting that
the concept of expression was identical with criticism’s very object of
study and thus a disciplinary sine qua non, but together with Spingarn’s
“The New Criticism,” they demonstrate that expression was crucial to
the way the young profession formulated its aims, justified itself to outsiders (including potential majors), and differentiated itself from other
kinds of inquiry.
The prominence of expression in the metacritical talk of these early
literary scholars, notwithstanding their influence during a decisive period of the discipline’s history, is apt to strike us today as strangely atavistic. This is because, for most of the twentieth century, the major trends
in literary theory were almost all resolutely hostile to the identification
of literature with expression. This anti- expressionism dates back to the
backlash against Spingarn himself. Despite or perhaps because of the
fact that his thesis (“Literature is an expression of something . . .”) was
so open- ended, placing so much emphasis upon the historical particularities of utterance and so little upon objective standards of evaluation,
scholars like Irving Babbitt accused him of propagating the notion that
modern society was “a universe with the lid off,” a domain gripped by a
“primitivism” in which man was condemned to an “indeterminate vagabondage of imagination and emotion.”5 A few decades later, the New Crit-
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ics would renew Babbitt’s anti- expressionism, updating his attack by
proffering along with it an objective, scientistic criticism of the kind pioneered by I. A. Richards. The philosophical rigor of the New Critics’ antiexpressionism is easy to underestimate. “Back of the many varieties of
expressionist theory lies the assumption of the common or the distinct
essence,” wrote Allen Tate in 1940, in an argument that anticipated the
antisubjectivist critiques of expression that structuralist and poststructuralist scholars would begin to flesh out beginning in the 1960s.6 For
all their differences, theorists like Roland Barthes, Louis Althusser, and
even Michel Foucault in his early work shared with Tate and other New
Critics a worry that the concept of expression had for too long held the
human and social sciences back from attaining a proper standard of
conceptual rigor. Althusser, in what was perhaps the most spectacular
document of twentieth- century anti- expressionism, referred to the “expressive totality” that Hegel had used to conceptualize the progress of
history as a “religious complicity between Logos and Being,” one of “those
tacit pacts in which the men of a still fragile age secured themselves
with magical alliances against the precariousness of history.”7 In talking
about expression in this way, Althusser didn’t necessarily mean the same
thing by the term as Tate and company, but he would have agreed with
Babbitt himself that the currency of expression in mainstream critical
discourse was proof that “society is plainly suffering from a lack rather
than a superabundance of discipline and restraint.”8
Americanist critics, over the period I’ve just been surveying and indeed up to the present, have distinguished themselves from other literary scholars by refusing to be bothered by the conceptual problems other
theorists have raised with expression. Ludwig Lewisohn, one of the fi rst
specialists in American texts, was a devoted partisan of expression. Reviewing the Spingarn–Babbitt disputation in his monumental Expression
in America, he would write that “both were pleading pro domo within
the framework of America; the one was seeking to preserve the America of his fathers; the other was seeking to conquer America for his
children.” 9 Lewisohn was surely wrong to think that Babbitt’s antiexpressionism was a thing of the past, as the New Critics were already
in the process of showing. But when his argument is read more narrowly as a statement about scholars of American literature working in
the United States, Lewisohn was surely onto something, as the writings of F. O. Matthiessen—not least American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson an Whitman—would most famously
demonstrate. Like Lewisohn, Matthiessen thought his advocacy of
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expression put him on the right side of his discipline’s history. Although
he tended to avoid polemics, no contemporary specialist would have
missed the import of Matthiessen’s approving citation in American Renaissance of Benedetto Croce, the Italian aesthetician whom the New
Critics had blamed for having introduced the doctrine of expression onto
the American scene, and whom Joel Spingarn had praised throughout
his career for precisely the same reason. Just as confidently as the New
Critics were insisting that expression had no place in the business of
literary studies, Matthiessen resolved to keep it front and center.
In the years since American Re naissance, many have challenged
Matthiessen, but no one has found reason to reproach his commitment
to expression, or the expressionist point of view that he took over from
Spingarn and Lewisohn. Even at the height of deconstruction, expression retained a degree of currency among Americanists whose sympathies otherwise aligned with this most quintessentially anti-expressionist
movement. Writing in Diacritics in 1977, Kenneth Dauber synthesized
expressionism and deconstruction, arguing of the canonical nineteenthcentury texts D. H. Lawrence had called “classics” that “the work was
not its author’s. It could never express him, could never express anything
but itself. And so he took his stand between works. He gave over the written for writing. Meaning became a function, no longer an idea to be
located within the text, but an operation, the act of producing texts
instead.”10 In a gesture that would be repeated by the multiculturalist critics of the Canon Wars (to whom I will return later), Dauber rectified expressionism by bringing it up to date. About certain things, he shows,
the tradition of Croce and Spingarn must have been wrong. Expressionism as those innovators imagined it was too idealist: the meaning of the
world does not originate in the minds of subjects, and it’s only by virtue
of a par ticu lar “language game” that anyone ever thought that literature
could represent such subjects’ interiority. Nevertheless, expression
as a “process” does not disappear. The text uncannily and ineluctably
“expresses . . . itself” against the backdrop of the author’s own expressive frustration, his “giving over” of the agency of signification to
discourse itself. Expression—what ordinary readers sometimes misconceive as free self- disclosure—is really an unending “transaction”
between a subject and circulating discourse: this was the compromise
Dauber effected between deconstruction and Americanist criticism, a
discipline that, at its best, had always been characterized by “a pretheoretical recognition of the nonobjectivity of the text.”11 Purged of its
folksy metaphysics of the subject, the study of expression survived the
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rise of poststructuralism as a dramatics of subjectivity understood as
a discursive strategy.
Why should this be? Where does Americanists’ “pre-theoretical recognition” of expression’s significance come from, and what makes the
concept of expression so effective as part of the technical repertoire of
modern critical knowledge? A satisfying discussion of the topic is far beyond the scope of present essay, for whose purposes it will hopefully suffice to enumerate three overlapping factors. The first is that Americanist
critics, part and parcel of their broader society, have tended to affi rm
expression as a norm, a pressure toward self-creation that guides the conduct of individual subjects. This norm is profoundly historical, as the philosopher Charles Taylor has done more than anyone else to demonstrate;
and yet it is often spoken about as if it were a natural drive or impulse—
as in Theodore Hunt’s comment, cited above, about his student’s quasilibidinous “eagerness for personal expression in literature.”12 Today, the
imaginary naturalness of expression’s normativity frequently manifests itself in the assumption that expression is an intrinsic human
right, freedom, or faculty that has always existed, even though our modern, secular society has only in the last few centuries gotten around to
discovering it.
Expression also serves critics as a principle of selection, a way of
defi ning and legitimating a field of collective inquiry. Consider the titles
not just of Lewisohn’s Expression in America or Matthiessen’s treatise
on Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman but also
of Arnold Krupat’s All That Remains: Varieties of Indigenous Expression (2009), or of the 2014 conference “African American Expression in
Print and Digital Culture” held at the University of Wisconsin. Such titles exemplify a protocol of canonization that confers critical meaning
by abstracting the text christened “expressive” from its initial scene of
utterance.13 To be sure, this principle of selection has become since Matthiessen’s time increasingly ecumenical, encompassing an ever-expanding
array of subjects, genres, and media of expression. But it is a principle
of selection nonetheless. Americanists have not historically made it their
business to silence the past.
Finally, the critical protocols and normative pressures that drive
Americanist scholars to see the texts they study as expressive are reflexive, bearing on the activity of knowledge itself. They help scholars
to identify objects of criticism but also to locate themselves as subjects
that stand in a relation of solidarity to those objects. To speak of a text
as “expressive” implies the existence of a mediated social space in which
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authors and interpreters can discover a likeness in one another; as Sheldon Pollock has argued, “Creating or consuming literature meant for large
worlds or small places is a declaration of affi liation with that world or
place . . . The practices of literary culture . . . are practices of attachment.”14 The textually mediated attachments cultivated by Americanist
criticism are not natural; they come into being alongside other forms of
solidarity that literary belonging may or may not displace. To study (and
teach) expression in the twenty-first century is to declare one’s affiliation
to a large world in which solidarities circulate among strangers, a world
in which subjectivity and textuality blur into one another at every turn.
For Americanists, the upshot of these overlapping societal and disciplinary understandings is that expression, plainly put, works: the term
is part and parcel of modern Americanist criticism, tripping off the tongue
in ways that would have been inconceivable even as recently as the nineteenth century. Consider, for instance, Hilary Wyss’s claim in Writing
Indians that “those Natives who did write, no matter what they wrote,
fundamentally altered the relationship between missionary culture and
Native people through the simple act of self- expression.”15 None of the
writers Wyss studies referred to what they wrote as “self- expression.”
Many of them, in fact, would have repudiated the notion that their writings were part of a process of verbal self-creation, or, at least, they would
have denied that this aspect of their writing was the thing that any audience ought to focus on. It requires a leap of critical imagination to say
that a corpus of early Native writings largely made up of deeds, contracts,
devotional exercises, and writing drills can be unified owing to their instantiation of “the simple act of self- expression.” Yet this is a leap Americanists have long been trained to make. It is a leap that Matthiessen
himself made throughout American Renaissance, where he deliberately,
painstakingly, and often counterintuitively assimilated his five great authors to an understanding of expression that they themselves would frequently have contested.
This discontinuity between past and present conceptions of creative
speech—and, in the case of American Re naissance, between antebellum and twentieth- century understandings of “expression”—is constitutive of the configuration of critical knowledge that this essay will be
referring to as “expressionism.” The discontinuity has frequently gone
unremarked by historians of expression; yet this, in itself, is not the problem this essay seeks to address. Expressionism is not a prejudice veiling the truth of history but a form of truth-telling we’ve forgotten we
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learned, what Foucault might have called a “buried” knowledge.16 What
follows is the sketch of a genealogy of Americanist expressionism: an attempt to recover this knowledge and its constitutive discontinuities, to
show how it came to be buried, and to suggest some of the ways in which
the history of expression might inform an understanding of Americanist
criticism’s recent past and unfolding present.
*

*

*

Expressionism, throughout the history of Americanist criticism, has been
both a protocol of knowledge-making and a structure of forgetting. A
clear example of this dual function is the title page of Ludwig Lewisohn’s
Expression in America with its epigraph,
All men live by truth, and stand in need of expression . . . . The
man is half himself, the other half is his expression. — EMERSON17
Surely the fact that man is “half . . . his expression” matters greatly for
Emerson, but so too, just as surely, does the fact that he is “half himself” even without expression. For Lewisohn, though (as for Matthiessen
later), the expressive half of man was the whole story, and thus Emerson’s aphorism could be read as an unambivalent document of the epochal nineteenth-century shift in which “an old crack in that rigid shell
which was supposed to represent the universe suddenly burst,” and expression made its long-overdue entrance onto the stage of world history.18
What’s forgotten in this reading is not only the half of Emerson’s “man”
that is not his expression but also the fact that Emerson’s putative expressionism reflected twentieth- century critical priorities that claimed
to be universal but were in fact highly selective. No one lived by these
priorities more clearly than Matthiessen, for whom self- expression was
both an aesthetic category and a principle of personal conduct; he admired Emerson not just as a writer but as the American whom he saw
as having “made one of the most challenging quests for a form that would
express his deepest convictions.”19 The force of Matthiessen’s reading of
Emerson cannot be distinguished from the urgency with which he seeks
to persuade his readers that expression was an indispensible concept
and practice for the historical present. But in Emerson’s own time,
expression was still a topic to be treated with carefully cultivated
ambivalence.
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For Emerson, the term “expression” was bound up with problems
that were at once social and semiotic, problems that reflected Transcendentalism’s status as a social movement whose participants aspired to
spiritual perfection outside the ritual frameworks of actually existing institutions. As Anne C. Rose wrote of Emerson in the period following
his resignation of the pastorship at Boston’s Second Church, “He did not
lose his faith . . . , but he had no adequate way to explain or express his
religious feelings.” 20 The semiotic difficulty posed by Emerson’s selfimposed exile from Christian frameworks of verbal interaction (his loss
of a “way to explain or express his religious feelings”) was compounded
by the naturalistic regimen of nonverbal receptivity—of “observation,”
“experience,” and “intuition”— that he cultivated in his dealings with
Nature.
Consider again the claim from Emerson’s “The Poet,” cited in Lewisohn’s epigraph, that “all men . . . stand in need of expression.” Now, it’s
true that this can be read, along Lewisohn’s or Matthiessen’s lines, as
identifying expression as an innate drive whose fulfi llment is a natural
goal of human life. But this doesn’t do justice to the defamiliarizing oddity of the phrase, which casts man as a kind of standing reservoir, not
unlike a cow that “stands in need of” milking. In the context of the broader
essay, the image suggests that poetry is a kind of husbandry: the poet’s
purpose is to “express” us—or, perhaps, to help us express ourselves.
Emerson isn’t especially clear about which, but that’s not a problem for
his argument, since it becomes clear over the course of the essay that
the real topic of the essay is not expression but the prelinguistic receptivities that attune the poet to the natural world around him: “touch,”
“impression,” and “intuition.” It’s that receptivity, Emerson wants us to
see, that “man” has become really bad at; the function of the Poet’s expression, above all, is not to dazzle us with the wonders of his verbal
per for mance but to make us aware of all the things we’ve missed. “The
young man reveres men of genius,” Emerson writes, “because, to speak
truly, they are more himself than he is. They receive of the soul as he
also receives, but they more.”21 So what, given the primacy of receptivity
in Emerson’s understanding of poetry, does “man” ’s animalistic “need of
expression” amount to? Not much, on its own, even for the poet himself,
whom Emerson declares to be “representative,” thanks to the pureness
of his intuition of Nature’s innate significance.
The questions facing such a person are the same ones Emerson faced
as an out- of-work minister: how does one locate expression as a social
practice? Upon what footing and in what context is the “man of genius”
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to address the rest of society? Emerson toys with the idea that the Poet
might fulfi ll the pastoral function that he himself had renounced when
he resigned his post at Boston’s Second Church: “I look in vain for the
poet I describe,” he writes, as if to suggest that a new leader might still
be around the corner.22 But this fantasy runs afoul of his insistence that
a man’s worth comes not from what he says to others but from what he
sees for himself. This, after all, was the point of Emerson’s leaving the
church in the fi rst place; as he had written in the “Divinity School Address,” “intuition . . . cannot be received at second hand.”23 His famous
lament makes the poet seem responsible for failing to manifest himself,
but it’s really Emerson who has failed to imagine a place for him in his
new social world.
In his early writings, Emerson dedicates himself to the philosophical problem of how the social-spiritual movement of Transcendentalism
ought to harness man’s inner propensity for speech, his “need of expression.” His concern is with verbal tactics for the here-and-now, with
furthering the transformation he sees at work in the nineteenth- century
world by asking how men and women can help one another to experience that world at “fi rst hand.” By the end of his career, though, he has
given up hope that modern society will yield up any one person who, by
the simple act of expression, can lead the masses to the redemptive intuition they so desperately need. In Representative Men, “The Poet,”
Shakespeare, speaks from the past to the present through the deep
time of Nature. There’s something appealingly archaic about his “power
of expression, of transferring the inmost truth of things into music and
verse,” a power that likens him to “some saint whose history is to be
rendered into all languages, into verse and prose, into songs and pictures, and cut up into proverbs; so that the occasion which gave the
saint’s meaning the form . . . is immaterial, compared with the universality of its application.”24 It is irrelevant to Emerson what, historically
or biographically speaking, occasioned Shakespeare’s speech: “the occasion . . . is immaterial.” Nor does Emerson ask whether Shakespeare
“stood in need of expression” in the same way that “all men” seem to in
the present day. For Emerson, what distinguishes the Poet of the past
from the mere “Writer” of the present (Goethe) is that the past Poet never
found himself in the predicament facing modern individuals, of “standing
in need” of expression but not necessarily having an “occasion” to give
“form” to “meaning.” Such an occasion can only be provided by the apperception of Nature’s truth, Emerson insists in opposition to those modern men who assume that a desire for self- culture can serve as sufficient
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reason for expressing oneself. It’s owing to modernity’s constant production of this spuriously occasioned speech that Emerson is so ambivalent about Goethe. “If he can not rightly express himself to- day, the
same things subsist and will open themselves to-morrow. There lies the
burden on his mind—the burden of truth to be declared,—more or less
understood.”25 The problem to which Goethe’s work testifies is that the
“truth” tends, in the present day, always to be “less understood.” The truth,
for Goethe (and other writers like him), is the mere truth of himself; and
thus, Emerson writes, “Goethe can never be dear to men. His is not even
the devotion to pure truth, but to truth for the sake of culture . . . The
idea of absolute, eternal truth, without reference to my own enlargement
by it, is higher. The surrender to the torrent of poetic inspiration is
higher.”26
What redeems Goethe in Emerson’s eyes—the reason he “fi nd[s] a
provision” for him “in the constitution of the world”—is not his “power
of expression” but his power of being “provoking to the mind,” of offering “so many unexpected glimpses into a higher sphere,” and thus of providing the attentive reader with a cause (“pro-”) for speech (“-vocation”)
that is ultimately more valuable for Emerson than the subject providing
it.27 Emerson’s reading of Goethe as an agent of “provocation” can be understood as a facet of the “way of life by abandonment” that Sharon Cameron and Branka Arsic have shown to be Emerson’s habitual way of
dealing with the world, for, by declining to countenance Goethe’s aspiration for “self- culture,” Emerson is effectively abandoning him.28 To observe that Emerson responds to Goethe’s provocation by means of
abandonment is to confront, once again, the impossibility of determining the social location of expression in Emerson’s writings, an impossibility that arises here not just because of Emerson’s refusal of the mode
of modern solidarity Goethe’s model of expressive self- culture entails
but also because, as Emerson argues elsewhere, it is perfectly possible
to provoke oneself in the absence of other people. The kind of selfforgetting that Emerson describes in “Circles,” for instance, can itself
be understood as a kind of provocation: one discovers an occasion for
further speech (for “draw[ing] a new circle”) by demystifying oneself
of one’s own personality. This provoking practice of self-renunciation
is the opposite of what Matthiessen had in mind when he spoke of
“expression.”
We fi nd a more concrete iteration of the Transcendentalists’ ethics
of provocation in the life of Henry David Thoreau. I say “life” and not
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“works” because, as Pierre Hadot argued, Thoreau was not in the fi rst
instance a maker of philosophical arguments but rather the practitioner
of a “spiritual discipline” whose goal was to regiment talk according to
the demands of Nature: as Hadot writes, “The true problem was not to
write, but to live in the woods, to be capable of supporting such an experience . . . this plunging into the heart of nature. In other words, the
philosophical act transcends the literary work that expresses it; and this
literary work cannot totally express what Thoreau has lived.”29 It was
this whole discipline—this experience of having “lived” in a way that subordinated expression to action—that Thoreau sought to communicate
to his readers. And since this discipline is predicated fundamentally
upon the regimentation of talk by that which is beyond talk, Thoreau
fi nds himself drawn repeatedly to the language of paradox, as in his twoline poem in A Week:
My life has been the poem I would have writ
But I could not both live and utter it.30
In American Re naissance, F. O. Matthiessen claimed Thoreau as an antecedent to expressionism by reading these lines as examples of the plain
and direct style that resulted from their author’s “desire to break down
all artificial divisions between art and living.”31 A more intuitive reading would be that the lines are the clearest case of the normative ambivalence of Thoreau’s talk, which he designs to reflect the volatile
simultaneity of two domains, life and poetry, that he experiences as
pulling him in opposite directions. On the one hand, the poem registers
his profoundest ambition to become what none of his peers had had the
audacity to be: a silent Transcendentalist, purified of any accountability to an audience. On the other, by mockingly vesting himself with
the heroism of the heroic couplet, Thoreau communicates in a selfconsciously conventional way the necessity of speaking, if he will speak
at all, within the bounds of convention. For Thoreau, the notion of a direct poetics of expressive self-manifestation is an illusion that must be
dispelled at every turn. Thoreau’s spiritual discipline requires that he
situate himself upon the boundary between life and expression and, from
that footing, demonstrate the urgency of crossing out of one domain and
into another.
The opening of Walking clarifies why Thoreau thinks life and talk
about life are necessarily at odds, such that one might fi nd oneself
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compelled to choose between them. “I wish to speak a word for Nature,”
he writes,
for absolute Freedom and Wildness, as contrasted with a freedom
and Culture merely civil,—to regard man as an inhabitant, or a
part and parcel of Nature, rather than a member of society. I wish
to make an extreme statement, if so I may make an emphatic one,
for there are enough champions of civilization; the minister, and
the school- committee, and every one of you will take care of
that.32
To take part in Thoreau’s naturalism, one must subject one’s consciousness to a shift in perspective that allows one to view from the standpoint
of “Nature” those phenomena that the “champions of Civilization” had
claimed to master. This shift in perspective allows one to undertake a
methodological reduction of Civilization to Nature. It is to this end Walking rehearses a natural history of humanity, beginning with Thoreau’s
observation of his irrepressible inclination to walk in a westerly direction. Inferring that this westering inclination is a general characteristic
of the human species, he goes on to suggest that, in America, “there is
perhaps one more chance for the race left before it arrives on the banks
of the Styx; and that is in the Lethe of the Pacific.”33 In order to make the
most of this chance, humans must learn to appreciate and preserve “wildness,” for it is only by experiencing wildness that man can learn a truth
about himself that the “champions of civilization” can never hope to
teach—that man is “part and parcel of Nature”— even though they think
they have a comprehensive understanding of Nature, which they call “science.” From Thoreau’s perspective, the kind of knowledge made possible by science is not wrong, but it is incorrectly expressed. As he writes
in his journal,
If I am overflowing with life, am rich in experience for which I lack
expression, then nature will be my language full of poetry—all
nature will be fable, and every natural phenomenon be a myth.
The man of science, who is not seeking for expression but for a
fact to be expressed merely, studies nature as a dead language.
I pray for such inward experience as will make nature significant.34
Scientific knowledge, for Thoreau, is a kind of undisciplined talk: “the
man of science” assumes that scientific language represents living na-
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ture, but that repre sentation, since it is sanctioned by Civilization, is
“dead.” According to the expressive discipline that Thoreau models, man
must accept that, owing to the sheer mass of impressions and intuitions
that Nature constantly makes available, it is in the nature of “experience”
for man to “lack expression.” To render one’s gratitude for nature’s “language full of poetry” as compensation for man’s “lack [of] expression” is
to acknowledge that expression is “part and parcel” of a totality that cannot be communicated according to Civilized protocols. As a faculty of
Nature, expression belongs outside of civilization, and man must face
the fact that its powers exceed his potential to harness them.
Thoreau solves the Transcendentalist problem of expression’s social
location by insisting that it has none, at least among the “civil.” This leaves
open the possibility that expression might serve as a medium of communication among the “champions” of Nature; but he rejects this possibility as well. Even more vehemently than Emerson, Thoreau insists that
one can only experience Nature alone. In the opening of Walking, Thoreau prepares to prove that he is “part and parcel of nature, rather than
a member of society” by turning his back on all the “champions of civilization,” a collective that includes not just “the minister, and the schoolcommittee” but also “every one of you.” Thoreau thus, paradoxically
again, recruits us as followers of his Natural way of life by insisting that
he must abandon us, and by making it incumbent upon us to abandon
him in return, along with everyone else we know: “If you are ready to
leave father and mother, and brother and sister, and wife and child and
friends, and never see them again—if you have paid your debts, and made
your will, and settled all your affairs, and are a free man—then you are
ready for a walk.”35 Thoreau does everything in his power to prepare us
to take this step but insists that we take it by ourselves, since there’s no
such thing as a collective agent of abandonment. The only fellowship enjoyed by the champions of Nature comes from the shared realization that
they are outsiders to one another. “I desire to speak somewhere without bounds,” he writes in the conclusion of Walden, “like a man in a waking moment, to men in their waking moments; for I am convinced that I
cannot exaggerate enough even to lay the foundation of a true expression.”36 To speak to someone in a “waking moment” is to speak with a
voice that seems to come from nowhere—which must necessarily be
where Natural man, in relation to his fellow men, finds himself. As a compensation for the impossibility of “true expression,” for direct communication with his fellow men, Thoreau settles for “extra- vagant . . .
exaggeration,” for allowing himself to be merely overheard. For expression
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itself to become communicative, the still-unredeemed Civilization of
the Transcendentalists would have to be left behind for one that was a
continuation of Nature, rather than a “second-hand” excrescence of it.
*

*

*

When Walt Whitman told Emerson (and everyone else) in the preface to
the 1856 Leaves of Grass that “the work of my life is making poems,” he
meant not just to echo Thoreau (“My life has been the poem I would have
writ / But I could not both live and utter it.”) but to outdo him and Emerson both, to announce himself as having fi nally discovered a social location for expression.37 After all, Whitman asked, why shouldn’t life and
the poetry of life coincide with one another? One has only to understand
the work of the poet’s life in the right way, as an activity of mediation
undertaken on behalf of both Nature and Civilization. A life-long denizen of print shops, Whitman knew that the work of circulating poetry
was a collective labor involving not just the publication and distribution
of printed materials but also the uptake of utterance in the hands of readers: again, “the work of my life is making poems. I keep on till I make a
hundred, and then several hundred— perhaps a thousand. The way is
clear to me. A few years, and the average annual call for my Poems is
ten or twenty thousand copies—more, quite likely.”38 The fact that the
masses were clamoring for his poetry (at least in his imagination) did
not signify for Whitman a craven appetite for “second-hand” experience
but rather the existence of thousands of future cameradoes. This is
the key discontinuity between the Ages of Emerson and Whitman: selfexpression, for Whitman, does not entail a loss of fidelity to Nature’s
originary meaningfulness.
Like Emerson and Thoreau, Whitman saw expression as an activity
that must be subjected to discipline in the ser vice of social and spiritual
progress; but for Whitman expression was not something that had to be
economized out of life, as it had been for Thoreau especially. As Allen
Grossman wrote of Whitman, “The bard distributes the value of personhood which is the value commuted in all other economic transactions.”39
In Thoreau’s view, one has to make time for life first and foremost, which
will never leave one enough time to write the poem of one’s life. But for
Whitman there’s no need to minimize expression because (as Americans
had learned of paper money during the fi nancial crises of the 1830s) one
can always print more. By 1855, the rules of the game have changed. The
purpose of disciplining expression is not to focus on the other things one
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could be doing but to extend one’s discursive presence as broadly as possible. As Grossman and a long line of critics following him have recognized, the new kind of “presence” made possible by circulating discourse
is Whitman’s fundamental poetic discovery, one he deploys in his verse
again and again. As he writes in “Song of the Open Road,” “I and mine
do not convince by arguments, similes, rhymes, / We convince by our presence.”40 In “Song of Myself,” Whitman demonstrates what’s involved in
such “convincing” by drawing attention to the ineluctable antecedence
of voice (“I . . .”) to diegesis (“. . . celebrate myself and sing myself.”), and
in the space of diegesis itself, by impressing upon his readers their complicity in the reproduction of the expressive presence he brings about:
My words itch at your ears till you understand them. . . .
(It is you talking just as much as myself, I act as the tongue of you,
Tied in your mouth, in mine it begins to be loosen’d.)41
Presence, for Whitman, is by definition co-presence. It circulates between
the poet and his reader in such a way as to create a new kind of subject,
immanent to discourse. Whitman underscores the newness of this subject in the preface to the 1855 Leaves of Grass where he urges his readers to consider his poems not as reproductions of himself (“What I
experience or portray shall go from my composition without a shred of
my composition”) but rather as the expressive manifestations of a new
kind of collective self: “You shall stand by my side and look in the mirror
at me,” Whitman tells his readers, recruiting them into the transcendence of their own individuality.42
What makes this collective self-manifestation worthwhile? Like
Emerson and Thoreau, Whitman knew that poetry required a provocation. For Whitman, that provocation was provided by life’s struggle
against limitations. It was “in an attempt to exceed or ‘go beyond’ the
modes of representing human embodiment in the discourse of his age,”
as Michael Moon has argued, that “Whitman set himself the problem of
attempting to project actual physical presence in a literary text.”43 According to Moon, Whitman’s experience of these limitations—be they
political, sexual, or literary—was an effect of society’s enforcement of a
regime of “bodilessness” and shame. But it’s also possible to read Whitman as suggesting that such limitations are not simply a matter of society forcing itself upon life, with the individual subject vested with the
responsibility of resistance, but also, and in the fi rst instance, of life’s
capacity to constrain itself and thereby to force upon subjects the
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responsibility for overcoming its own self-generated barriers. It’s this
responsibility that Whitman asserts in the climactic stanza of “As I
Ebb’d with the Ocean of Life”:
O baffled, balk’d, bent to the very earth,
Oppress’d with myself that I have dared to open my mouth,
Aware now that amid all that blab whose echoes recoil upon me
I have not once had the least idea who or what I am,
But that before all my arrogant poems the real Me stands yet
untouch’d, untold, altogether unreach’d, . . .
Nature here in sight of the sea taking advantage of me to dart
upon me and sting me,
Because I have dared to open my mouth to sing at all.44
Whitman here dramatizes a process of becoming “oppress’d with myself”
that is occasioned by expression itself—by “my arrogant poems,” which
are felt to enforce their own mode of self-repression. That the poems assume this aspect is an effect of the passage of time. As we have already
seen, Whitman is concerned to avoid a poetics of self-representation
since, like Emerson, he refuses to see the self as a stable referent. This
is why, looking back on his past writings, he can’t help but be appalled
by their recrudescent representational stability. In the present moment,
those very poems that had once “convince[d] by our presence” now bring
about the very self-alienation they had once overcome (“before all my
arrogant poems the real Me stands yet untouch’d, untold, altogether
unreach’d”). Realizing that any single poem is incapable of permanently
forestalling this temporal de-presencing on its own terms, Whitman
never theless fi nds meaning in his own belatedness by figuring poetry as
a process of self-following, a reappropriation of life’s cast- off materials:
“I gather for myself and for this phantom looking down where we lead,
and following me and mine.” It’s possible to interpret this self-gathering
as a compensatory fantasy, a concealment of the speaker’s inability to
reconcile external psychosocial pressures.45 But such a reading, ultimately, fails to confront what is perhaps the most difficult question Whitman’s poetry raises, which is whether repression is always an effect of
heteronomy, whether it isn’t generated out of the same natural process
that gives rise to expression itself. “As I Ebb’d with the Ocean of Life”
can thus be read as dramatizing not just the self-“oppression” Whitman
experiences as a consequence of his past utterances but also his refusal
to see himself as internalizing a preexisting symbolic order, since any
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such order can always be seen as retrospectively constituted from the
perspective of the “following” present. Expression has become the semiotic modality of life’s progressive reconstitution of itself.
The presentness of Whitman’s expressive “gathering” can helpfully
be contrasted to the temporal scheme of intuition and expression that
characterizes the writings of Emerson and Thoreau. In the conclusion to
Walden, Thoreau had written,
I am convinced that I cannot exaggerate enough even to lay the
foundation of a true expression. Who that has heard a strain of
music feared then lest he should speak extravagantly any more
forever? In view of the future or possible, we should live quite
laxly and undefi ned in front, our outlines dim and misty on that
side; as our shadows reveal an insensible perspiration toward the
sun. The volatile truth of our words should continually betray
the inadequacy of the residual statement.46
Truth, for Thoreau, “betrays” the impossibility of “true expression” because it antecedes expression, both logically and temporally; it is closer
to Nature, the permanent source of all meaning. It is in tribute to that
antecedent source, Thoreau thinks, that “we should live quite laxly and
undefi ned in front, our outlines dim and misty on that side.” For Whitman, by contrast, our experience of the world is always less “defi ned”
than the expression that gathers it into discourse. In “As I Ebb’d With
the Ocean of Life,” the defi ning power of poetic expression is the means
through which the self overcomes the failure of self-understanding that
its own prior utterances had occasioned, thereby reconstituting for itself an open future. Later, in Democratic Vistas, Whitman would anticipate that the third and culminating stage of progress in the United States,
“rising out of the previous ones, to make them and all illustrious,” would
begin with the “announcing [of] a native expression- spirit.”47 He found
that he could apply his conception of expression as a future-oriented process of self-gathering to social experience on every possible scale.
*

*

*

Whitman’s theorization of expression as an agency of social mediation
was a development that Emerson and Thoreau could scarcely have imagined. Yet it was precisely this understanding of expression that would
gain ground over the second half of the nineteenth century, not just among
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poets like Whitman but in a wide variety of speech genres including, by
the end of the century, the disciplinary discourses of the human sciences.48 The literary-historical gesture, for instance, through which Joel
Spingarn read the intellectual history of the nineteenth century as a unified affi rmation of expression itself (“For all these critics, literature is
the expression of something . . .”) can now be seen as an eminently Whitmanian one. For Spingarn, as for Whitman, expression was a reflexive
practice of solidarity that ushered in a new era of interpretation: as he
argued in “The New Criticism,” “Criticism at last can free itself of its agelong self- contempt, now that it may realize that aesthetic judgment and
artistic creation are instinct with the same vital life.” Spingarn called the
sort of scholarship made possible by this realization “creative criticism”
and, like Whitman, theorized reading as a mode of discursive co-presence
that created a bond of solidarity between writer and reader. As he put it,
in the terminology of his day, “Taste must reproduce the work of art
within itself in order to understand and judge it; and at that moment aesthetic judgment becomes nothing more nor less than creative art itself.”49
Whitman’s provocation, “And what I assume, you shall assume,” was now
a protocol of disciplinary knowledge.50
Whitman’s continuity with Spingarn marks his discontinuity with the
Transcendentalists: there was no unified “Art . . . [of] Expression in the
Age of Emerson and Whitman.” Still, the case of Spingarn can help us
understand why Matthiessen thought there was. Matthiessen’s compendium of expression in American Re naissance is not, after all, that different from Spingarn’s intellectual history of the nineteenth century,
which forged often irreconcilable views into a univocal consensus. Nor
did Matthiessen’s history of expression restrict itself to the period and
authors covered in American Re naissance. In The Achievement of T. S.
Eliot (1935), Matthiessen assimilated Eliot himself to the tradition of expressionism that he would only later trace back to the antebellum United
States. This text has been widely misunderstood as evidence of Matthiessen’s “formalism” or “modernism.” In “Nationalizing the New Criticism”
(1996) Evan Carton and Gerald Graff interpreted Matthiessen’s enthusiasm for Eliot as a methodological endorsement of the New Critics, for
whom Eliot was also a seminal figure: all these thinkers were part of
the same “modernist and New Critical generation.”51 Graff and Carton’s
history reflected a widespread consensus among Americanists since
the 1980s that Eliot, Matthiessen, and the New Critics all sought to prioritize form at the expense of history. The way to arrive at a more faithful understanding of the nineteenth century, it was argued during and

Ryan Carr · Toward a Genealogy of Americanist Expressionism

107

J19
after the Canon Wars, was to ignore the distorting fi lters imposed by
Matthiessen and other literary modernists during the fi rst half of the
twentieth.
One outcome of revisionists’ conflation of Matthiessen and the New
Critics was the forgetting of a highly consequential debate that took
place between them on the topic of expression in T. S. Eliot’s theory
of poetry. In fact, The Achievement of T. S. Eliot was a thinly veiled attack on the New Critics’ anti- expressionist reading of Eliot, which
pointed literary criticism down a path Matthiessen was determined not
to follow. Matthiessen’s expressionist reading of Eliot was an effort to
seize him away from the New Critics, and in so doing to vindicate an expressionist way of reading that was avowedly modern but not at all “Modernist” in the ahistorical sense of the term that later Americanists would
associate with the “generation” of the New Criticism. On the contrary,
according to Matthiessen’s reading of Eliot, expression, and the reflexive history of expression, were ways of coping with the specific historical problems modernity posed. The Achievement of T. S. Eliot is a critical
text for a genealogy of expressionism, then, for two reasons: first, it shows
that Matthiessen was not a New Critic and thus prepares us to see how,
by misrecognizing him as such, later revisionists would let his expressionism (which they frequently shared) pass as perfectly natural; and second, it clarifies the historical understanding of expression that would
motivate Matthiessen’s later reinvention of himself as a champion of
American democracy in American Re naissance.
Matthiessen and the New Critics could agree to disagree about T. S.
Eliot because Eliot’s own writings on the topic of expression were deeply
ambivalent and sometimes mutually contradictory. The anti-expressionist
side of Eliot’s writings is perhaps best encapsulated in the thesis from
“Tradition and the Individual Talent” that “poetry is . . . not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality.”52 For Eliot, the identification of poetry with the “expression of personality” mistakenly
assumes that persons are capable of referring to their thoughts and emotions. In opposition to this naive view, Eliot holds that our most intense
emotions are unrepresentable because they themselves have no determinable referent. “The intense feeling, ecstatic or terrible, without an object or exceeding its object” simply cannot be represented as a feature
of an individual’s personality; as Eliot famously puts it, “The only way
of expressing emotion in the form of art is by fi nding an ‘objective correlative’; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events
which shall be the formula of that par ticular emotion; such that when
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the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given,
the emotion is immediately evoked.”53 Fortunately, Eliot thinks, we have
a way of recognizing which of our emotions can be “evoked” in this way
and which of them cannot; we have something modeled after what Irving
Babbitt (one of Eliot’s professors in graduate school) had called an “inner check or principle of vital control,” a way of distinguishing which
aspects of our experience are communicable.54 Eliot argues in “Hamlet
and his Problems” that Shakespeare, in writing that play, failed to exercise such an inner check; therefore his play is a failure and its author’s
intentions forever unclear: “under compulsion of what experience he attempted to express the inexpressibly horrible, we cannot ever know.”55
Those critics who search in poetry for an “expression of personality,”
when personality is defi ned in this way, are doomed to failure.
The pro- expressionist influence on Eliot is equally discernible, in
“Tradition and the Individual Talent,” in the same passage from which I
cited above. “Poetry . . . is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality. But, of course,” Eliot goes on, “only those who
have personality and emotions know what it means to want to escape
from these things.”56 The qualification is just as important as the slogan
that precedes it, for this “want[ing] to escape” ourselves is itself a fact
about ourselves; poetry can therefore not be understood except as the
manifestation of an inner tension arising within a collective subject,
“those who want to escape.” Eliot’s version of the poet’s “inner check”
militates against the straightforward representation of personality, but
the technique of verbal “escape” peculiar to the poetic subject is nevertheless an effect of those very same inescapable emotional experiences.
As Eliot’s famous metaphor of poet-as-catalyst makes clear, poetic representation retains nothing of the internal contents of the “personality” that
produces it; but this absence of correspondence, in and of itself, does
not distinguish Eliot in any obvious way from a poet like Whitman, who
had insisted as early as 1855 that “what I experience or portray shall go
from my composition without a shred of my composition.” What distinguishes Eliot from Whitman is the former’s insistence that personality
needs to be ontologically transfigured, as it were, to realize itself in poetic discourse; this conviction has its roots in Eliot’s re-importation into
poetics of the theological notion that personality is a compromised mode
of existence, always in need of redemption. Eliot’s conviction in the necessity of this transfiguration, and not his anti- expressionism, is what
really distinguishes his theory of tradition and the “historical sense” undergirding it—“a perception,” he writes, “not only of the pastness of the
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past, but of its presence”—from Whitman and Spingarn’s understanding
of poetic (and critical) expression as a kind of speech that gathers the
past into the present and thereby reconstitutes it.
Most importantly, Eliot and the expressionists agree that the resolution of the confl icted self’s “wants” must happen symbolically, in discourse: “for my meaning is, that the poet has, not a ‘personality’ to
express, but a par ticu lar medium, which is only a medium and not a
personality.” Spingarn, who did not believe that poetry was a kind of
transfiguration, would have found no use for the distinction between
the self and its mediation. But for this very reason he might have agreed
with Eliot’s Whitmanian claim that poetry cannot be seen as the representation of an antecedent subject. For Eliot, as for Spingarn, it’s the
instantaneousness—the presence—of poetic utterance that’s key; it’s this
emphasis that marks his departure, finally, from his teacher Babbitt’s theory of the “inner check,” which had been grounded cognitively in “the
perception on the part of the individual, of a something in himself that
he possesses in common with other men.”57 Eliot, for his part, refuses
to believe that what’s collective in a society is available to any individual’s introspection, let alone academic study. The sorts of experience that
constitute poetry, and by extension the tradition, come to us only through
discourse—through reading and writing. One does not need to engage
in these textual activities in order to have a “personality”; they are a compensatory superaddition to human experience and, as such, seem at times
to take on an institutional and conceptual autonomy in Eliot’s criticism
as agents of their own reproduction. This may explain why, in an unguarded moment in “A Brief Treatise on the Criticism of Poetry,” Eliot
finds himself assimilating criticism itself to the domain of poetic creativity: “Every form of genuine criticism is directed toward creation. The historical or the philosophical critic of poetry is criticising poetry in order
to create a history or a philosophy; the poetic critic is criticising poetry
in order to create poetry.”58 Eliot’s criticism, in this moment, unambiguously announces its imbrication in the reflexive practice of “creative criticism” that Spingarn had introduced into American literary studies.
Criticism and poetry alike become modalities of an expressive discourse
that brings a collective literary subject into being.
In “The Perfect Critic,” Eliot would walk back his endorsement of
creative criticism, insisting on the fundamental unlikeness of critical subjectivity or “intelligence” to criticism’s object of study: “It is fatuous,” he
concludes, “to say that criticism is for the sake of ‘creation’ or creation
for the sake of criticism.” “Fatuous,” perhaps, but not necessarily wrong.
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The fact is that Eliot’s early criticism never decisively answers the fundamental question that animates it: does poetry’s power consist in transfiguring the personal into a referential object stripped of any indexical
relation to an existing subject, or is poetry one among many “media to
express,” a vector of a historical self-realization capable of fostering solidarity, across genres and media, among a collective subject of “escape”?
This is the question that subsequent critics would fight to resolve. For the
New Critics, Eliot’s recantation of creative criticism would have meant
that he was on his way to a properly objective or “ontological,” as opposed
to merely “historical,” criticism, to use the typology developed in John
Crowe Ransom’s The New Criticism (1941). In hindsight, Eliot’s dalliance
with Spingarnian notions was a transgression that could be forgiven. The
general attitude of the New Critics is captured by Cleanth Brooks and William Wimsatt in their Literary Criticism: A Short History: Eliot’s thesis
that poetry “is not an expression of personality, but an escape from personality” marks a new era in the history of criticism, “but Eliot, in the way
in which he argues it, manages to involve himself in the language of expressionism.”59 Nevertheless, declaring their defiance of those critics who
would suggest continuities between Eliot and other expressionists, Wimsatt and Brooks propose that Eliot’s “language of expressionism” can be
subjected to what they call a conceptual “pruning operation” and thus
overlooked as a product of a backward age.60 What could be kept, and was
essential for the New Critics, was the reformed Eliot’s insistence on the
mutual irrelevance of critic-as- subject and poem-as- object, a premise
that Eliot had inherited from Babbitt and had, in his earlier criticism,
sought to qualify in his famous account of the poet’s expressive transfiguration. The New Critics thus appropriated Eliot by turning him into a
neo-Babbitt. In the reformed discipline they envisioned, recognizing the
various “fallacies” brought about by attempting to relate to poems as
the utterances of subjects was a new way of exercising an “inner check,”
a way of teaching the self to discriminate between what in one’s encounter with literature was merely subjective, and what was truly universal.
Although Matthiessen’s The Achievement of T. S. Eliot has often
been read as a formalist or New Critical text, we are now in a position
to see that the opposite is in fact the case, that Matthiessen in fact draws
out the same expressionist strain of Eliot’s thinking that Ransom, Brooks,
and Wimsatt were determined to suppress. To be sure, Matthiessen’s
point of departure was similar to that of the New Critics: in his preface,
he observes that “the most widespread error in contemporary criticism
is to neglect form and to concern itself entirely with content” and declares
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it his aim to work against “the increasing tendency to treat poetry as a
social document and to forget that it is an art.”61 But it soon becomes
apparent that these appeals to critical disciplinarity are made from an
entirely different conceptual standpoint from that of the New Critics.
Whereas the latter were concerned, in their readings of Eliot and elsewhere, to overcome the fallacies of critical subjectivity by grounding
criticism’s scientificity in the ontological specificity of its object of
study, Matthiessen sets out to show that Eliot’s project is the expression
of a collective historical subject that is historical and distinctively “modern.” In his fi rst chapter he reads “Tradition and the Individual Talent”
alongside Eliot’s 1930 essay on Baudelaire in order to show that, for
Eliot, “the thing of highest importance for the poet is to ‘express with
individual differences the general state of mind, not as a duty, but simply
because’—if he possesses that rare, unyielding honesty which alone will
give his work depth—‘he cannot help participating in it.’ ” 62 Matthiessen’s citation, it must be said, bears only a tangential relation to “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” which has nothing at all to say about the
“general state of mind” in any single historical moment, but it helps clarify what Matthiessen might have had in mind when he spoke in his preface as an advocate of “form” and opponent of “document[ary]” criticism:
“form” is not an object but an event in the history of a subject, an event
whose carrying- off depends on an ethical attitude of “honesty.” For Matthiessen, “honesty” describes the kind of expression that is most at a premium in an age when “modern educated man possesses a knowledge of
the past to a degree hardly glimpsed a century ago” and thus fi nds himself tormented by a paralyzing “self- consciousness.”63 In his effort to
demonstrate how “keenly aware” Eliot is of “our contemporary historical consciousness, and of the problems it creates,” Matthiessen fi nds
himself drawn to Eliot’s “tragic” poems, in which the bleakness of modern life becomes salient not because of the way it provides raw material
for social “documentation” but because it provides an occasion for the
poet to prove his capacity for speaking with honesty, for undertaking
“the unfl inching, if agonized, expression of what he knows to be true”:
Through the completeness of his portrayal of the almost insupportable conditions of human existence, he frees his audience
from the oppression of fear; and stirring them to new heart by his
presentation of a heroic struggle against odds, he also enables
them to conceive anew the means of sustaining and improving
their own lives.64
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It’s here, more than anywhere else in his writings, that Matthiessen identifies himself as a follower of the expressionist turn that his predecessors Whitman and Spingarn had helped bring into the literary disciplines.
Setting aside those aspects of Eliot’s literary theory that would militate
against understanding poetry as a mode of collective self-becoming, Matthiessen identifies expression as a “pre sentation of a heroic struggle
against odds,” a medium for the collective overcoming of the limitations
emergent within historical experience.
For Matthiessen, this conceptual renovation of expression had implications that were at once scholarly and political. In scholarly terms,
it helped ensure literary criticism’s disciplinary specificity by identifying
literary form with the “completeness of the portrayal” of the quandaries
of history. The gathering of modernity’s contradictions into a “unified” utterance establishes the co- presence of writer and reader by
conveying what Matthiessen calls “the actual sensation of life”: “literature,” as he puts it, “must certainly end with giving a sense of life.” 65
Whereas Wimsatt and Beardsley would argue in “The Affective Fallacy” that “though cultures have changed and will change, poems remain and explain,” Matthiessen fi nds in Eliot the makings of a historical
understanding of criticism’s object of study and of its discipline of reading, both of which are specific to the collective subject called “modern
educated man.”66
Literature’s political potential lies in its capacity to bring about the
progressive self-realization of this same collective subject; here, the relevant phrase in the passage cited above is “free[ing] them from the oppression of fear,” a phrase that marks a clear departure from Eliot’s
insistence that poetry undoes itself when it strives to “express the inexpressibly horrible.” For Eliot, man’s original fallibilities were simply too
constraining for poetry to be anything other than an “escape from personality”; he could not redeem himself spiritually through his own worldly
activities, in poetry or in politics. Yet Matthiessen—who, like Whitman,
believes that self- expression is its own kind of progress— sees Eliot’s
work as proving the opposite point, that “the mature artists fi nds his
strength partly by coming to recognize and reckon with his limitations.”67
The task of modern man is coping with his own limitations, by himself.
Matthiessen would make this somewhat more concrete in the preface
to the second edition of the Eliot book (1947): “My growing divergence
from [Eliot’s] view of life,” he writes, “is that I believe that it is possible
to accept the ‘radical imperfection’ of man, and yet to be a political radical
as well, to be aware that no human society can be perfect, and yet to
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hold that the proposition ‘all men are created equal’ demands dynamic
adherence from a Christian no less than a democrat.” 68 No reader of
American Re naissance will be surprised to fi nd Matthiessen, in such a
passage, recalibrating his own relation to postwar geopolitics. And yet
it’s worth keeping in mind that it’s only in 1947, twelve years following
his book’s fi rst appearance, that Matthiessen fi nds it necessary to read
Eliot’s work in light of the markedly American doctrine that “all men are
created equal.” The Achievement of T. S. Eliot thus assimilated itself to
the disciplinary history of American Studies, but only contingently: it documents the gradual process through which expressionism and American Studies found that they were a perfect match for each other. The
match was mutually beneficial. In the discourse of expressionism, those
who (like Matthiessen, ultimately) would advocate for the historical singularity of the American nation found a way of doing so in a disciplinary way that— however prejudiced it may have been in favor of white
northern males—avoided the essentialist supposition of a fi xed American character. And at the same time, the disciplinary subject of expressionism, increasingly beleaguered by the assaults of “scientific” criticism,
found in American Studies a durable institutional location within which
it could operate in relative insulation from anti- expressionist polemics.
Matthiessen’s effort to constitute a critical Americanist subject has
troubled readers as frequently as it has inspired them, but it set the
terms for the future of the discipline. In his turn and return to Eliot and
in American Re naissance, we can witness the beginning of the stillongoing process through which the disciplinary subject of Americanist
expressionism—the critical “we”—has set itself to the task of reimagining its political affi liations. This process of reimagination has outlasted
Matthiessen’s national and sociocultural prejudices, allowing Americanist scholars to recognize and also to experiment with modes of expressive subjectivity that only occasionally identify themselves as American
and indeed frequently oppose the very idea of a national literature. The
expressive subjects who are both the agents and objects of Americanist
criticism, in other words, have from the very beginning been subject to
reconstitution.
The best evidence of the resiliency of Matthiessen’s expressionism
comes from his most hostile critics. Time and again, skeptics have insisted that Matthiessen studied the wrong authors and cultivated the
wrong kind of critical discipline, but without questioning his central assumption that criticism ought to be a reflexive history of expression. Jane
Tompkins, for example, concluded her Sensational Designs by proposing
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that her book and Matthiessen’s were “competing attempts to constitute American literature”; this reconstitution was necessary because
“Matthiessen’s modernist critical principles had set at a discount” certain key works of nineteenth- century literature. And yet, though Tompkins had a great deal to say about Matthiessen’s “modernist” theories of
art and aesthetics, she deployed expression throughout her study in much
the same way that Matthiessen himself had: her “notion of literary texts
as doing work, expressing and shaping the social context that produced
them,” extends but in no way refutes Matthiessen’s thesis that the “concentrated moment of expression” upon which he had focused was, in the
last instance, relevant because it was a fulfi llment of the “possibilities
of democracy.”69 Matthiessen’s expressionism flies under the radar of critique even more strikingly in Jonathan Arac’s “F. O. Matthiessen: Authorizing an American Renaissance.” Arac proposes early on in his essay
“to explore in some detail Matthiessen’s title” and proceeds to devote
whole paragraphs to the words “American,” “Renaissance,” “Art,” “Age,”
and “Emerson and Whitman”—but he has nothing at all about to say about
what Matthiessen might have meant by the term “expression,” or about
whether his usage of that term confirms Arac’s general thesis that American Re naissance is a self- contradicting work.70 This omission reveals
a contradiction in Arac’s own argument that “to create the centrally authoritative critical identity of American Re naissance, much had to be
displaced or scattered or disavowed,” especially since the “modern critical practice” Arac ascribes to Matthiessen had supposedly “required
abandoning the modes of ‘impressionist’ reading, the orientation
that M. H. Abrams has called ‘expressive.’ ”71 We are thus confronted with
a paradox that Arac leaves unresolved: on the one hand, Matthiessen is
said to subscribe to a modernist “discipline of letters” that requires him
to leave the expressive theory of poetry behind; on the other, he is shown
to introduce into that same discipline a concept— expression—that is
strangely unsusceptible to metacritical interrogation. Despite Arac and
Tompkins’s best efforts to negate the “discipline of letters” they thought
Matthiessen had imposed upon American literary studies, they themselves could not say no to expressionism. All they could do was drive it
underground, obscuring the disciplinary continuity that linked their own
critical moment to the age of Spingarn, Lewisohn, and Matthiessen
himself. Inadvertently, then, the “New Americanist” misidentification of
Matthiessen as a “Modernist” effected the reconstitution of the old
Americanist discipline of expressionism, which has perdured down to
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our own time—“buried,” but nevertheless profoundly imbricated with the
reproduction of critical knowledge.
Americanists in the twenty-fi rst century may have forgotten about
expressionism, but they continue to live with it, and its problems. Today
as much as ever, scholars risk falling back on the paralogism that has
beset expressionist criticism since the days of Lewisohn: the notion that
expression is the telos of all utterance, rather than a historically specific
technique of self-mediation. Nevertheless, a genealogy of expressionism
is one way in which Americanist criticism can tell a true history of itself, a history that makes sense of the disciplinary past in a way that can
orient criticism to the scholarly and political struggles of the present.
Above all, at a time of widespread methodological dissensus, the genealogy of expression raises fundamental questions of disciplinary identity: should interpretation aspire to reflexivity, to offer an account of its
object of study that is also an account of itself? In what ways can we
imagine criticism affi rming its status as a practice of mediated solidarity, what Sheldon Pollock calls a “practice of attachment?” How can students trained in what has historically been a nationally orga nized field
of knowledge understand their research as relevant to the study of modernity in general? In the past, expressionism has shown that it has answers to these questions, answers that can be redeployed in the present
to justify and explain a range of critical activities, some of which Americanists are already undertaking, and some of which might not yet exist. If such re-imaginings seem desirable, it may be time to recommit to
expression as an object of study and scholarly ethic. Or perhaps it is time
to start talking about something else.
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